included within the boundaries of the demos. Along with the formal expansion of citizenship rights, the enrichment of the scope of rights from civil to political and to social rights took place. 1 In this process, the ideal of self-governance was increasingly interpreted as the formal equality of the citizens of the demos who now sought to realize the equal value of their liberty in terms of an equivalent schedule of rights and entitlements. The civic-republican ideal of self-governance, the exercise of freedom among equals in a public space, is connected -and I would argue inevitably and necessarily -to the liberal ideal of citizenship as the practice and enjoyment of rights and benefits. Modern democracies seek to integrate these republican and liberal ideals into the practices of "public" and "private autonomy." While the private autonomy of citizens presupposes the exercise and enjoyment of liberty through a rights-framework which undergirds the equal value of their liberty, public autonomy is realized through the institutions of democratic self-governance in increasingly complex societies.
This relatively successful synthesis of republican and liberal-democratic ideals, or of public and private autonomy is today in crisis. The crisis, I want to suggest, is not the crisis of democracy in the first place but rather the crisis of the territorially circumscribed nation-state formation.
The modern (nation-) state in the West, in the course of its development from the 16th to the 19th centuries, struggled to attain four goals: territorial dominion; administrative control; consolidation of collective cultural identity, and the achievement of political legitimacy through increasing democratic participation. Yet contemporary developments-such as the rise of a global economy through the formation of free markets in capital, finance, and labor; the increasing internationalization of armament, communication, and information technologies; the emergence of international and transnational cultural networks and electronic spheres, and the growth of sub-and transnational political actors, among other factors-herald the fragmentation of these state functions.
It has now become commonplace in normative political thought as well as the social sciences to discuss "the end of the nation-state" and "the demise of Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty." But I want to argue that contemporary developments are much more complicated than is suggested by these phrases, for even in the face of the collapse of traditional conceptions of state-sovereignty, monopoly over territory is exercised through immigration and citizenship policies. Yet neglecting the normative and empirical dimensions of the cross-border movements of peoples is equally widespread in contemporary thought.
All pleas to develop 'post-Wetsphalian' conceptions of sovereignty 2 are ineffective if they do not also address the normative regulation of peoples' movement across territorial boundaries. From a philosophical point of view, transnational migrations bring to the fore the constitutive dilemma at the heart of liberal democracies as between sovereign self-determination claims on the one hand and adherence to universal human rights principles on the other. I will argue that practices of political membership may best be illuminated through an internal reconstruction of these dual commitments.
3
It is estimated that whereas in 1910 roughly 33 million individuals lived in countries other than their own as migrants, by the year 2000 that number had reached 175 million. During this same period , the population of the world is estimated to have grown from 1.6 to 5.3 billion, that is by threefold. Migrations, by contrast, increased almost sixfold over the course of these ninety years. Strikingly, more than half of the increase of migrants from 1910 to 2000 occurred in the last three decades of the twentieth-century, between 1965 and 2000. In this period 75 million people undertook cross-border movements to settle in countries other than that of their origin. (UN
International Migration Report 2002)
While migratory movements in the latter half of the twentieth-century have accelerated, the plight of refugees has also grown. There are almost 20 million refugees, asylum seekers and "internally displaced persons" in the world. The resource-rich countries of Europe and the northern hemisphere face growing number of migrants, but it is mostly nations in the southern hemisphere, such as Chad, Pakistan, Ingushetia, that are home to hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing from wars in the neighbouring countries of Central African Republican, Afghanistan, and Chechnya.
4
As one thoughtful student of world-wide immigration trends has observed, "Over the past one hundred years, international migration has often been at the center stage of To ascertain such trends need not commit one to exaggerated claims about the 'end' of the state system. The irony of current political developments is that while state sovereignty in economic, military, and technological domains has been greatly eroded, it is nonetheless vigorously asserted, and national borders, while more porous, are still there to keep out aliens and intruders. The old political structures may have waned but the new political forms of globalization are not yet in sight.
We are like travelers navigating an unknown terrain with the help of old maps, drawn at a different time and in response to different needs. While the terrain we are traveling on, the world-society of states, has changed our normative map has not. I do not pretend to have a new map to replace the old one, but I do hope to contribute to a better understanding of the salient fault-lines of the unknown territory which we are traversing. The growing normative incongruities between international human rights norms, particularly as they pertain to the "rights of others" --immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers --and continuing assertions of territorial sovereignty are the novel features of this new landscape. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the right to freedom of movement across boundaries --a right to emigrate--that is to leave a country, but not a right to immigrate, a right to enter a country. (Article 13) Article 14 anchors the right to enjoy asylum under certain circumstances, while Article 1 of the Declaration proclaims that everyone has a "the right to a nationality." The second half of Article 15 stipulates that "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality." (http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm)
The Universal Declaration is silent on states' obligations to grant entry to immigrants, to uphold the right of asylum, and to permit citizenship to alien residents and denizens. These rights have no specific addressees and they do not appear to anchor specific obligations on the part of second and third parties to comply with them. Despite the cross-border character of these rights, the Declaration upholds the sovereignty of individual states. Thus a series of internal contradictions between universal human rights and territorial sovereignty, are built right into the logic of the most comprehensive international law documents in our world. See Rawls's astonishing comment: "a democratic society, like any political society, is to be viewed as a complete and closed social system. It is complete in that it is selfsufficient and has a place for all the main purposes of life. It is also closed … in that entry into it is only by birth and exit from it is only by death… Thus, we are not see as joining society at the age of reason, as we might join an association, but as being born into a society where we will lead a complete life." John Rawls, Political Liberalism. There is not only a tension, but often an outright contradiction, between human rights declarations and states'sovereign claims to control their borders as well as to monitor the quality and quantity of admittees. There are no easy solutions to the dilemmas posed by these dual commitments. I will not call for the end of the state system nor for world-citizenship. Rather, following the Kantian tradition of cosmopolitan federalism 11 I will underscore the significance of membership within bounded communities and defend the need for 'democratic attachments' that need not be directed only toward existing nation-state structures. Quite to the contrary: as the institution of citizenship is disaggregated and state sovereignty comes under increasing stress, sub-national as well as supra-national spaces for democratic attachments and agency are emerging in the contemporary world, and they need to be advanced with, rather than in lieu of, existing polities. It is important to respect the claims of diverse democratic communities, including their distinctive cultural, legal and constitutional selfunderstandings, while strengthening their commitments to emerging norms of cosmopolitical justice. 
II

Disaggregation of Citizenship within the European Union
The concept of citizenship in the modern state can be analytically divided into three components: the collective identity of those who are designated as citizens along the lines of shared language, religion, ethnicity, common history and memories; the privileges of political membership in the sense of access to the rights of public autonomy; and the entitlement to social rights and privileges. What we are witnessing today is an 'unbundling' of these components . One can have political membership rights without sharing the common identity of the majority; one can have access to social rights and benefits without sharing in self-governance and without being a national.
Within the European Union, in which this disaggregation effect has proceeded most intensively and which I have examined in detail in other writings, 12 the privileges of political membership now accrue to all citizens of member countries of the Union who may be residing in territories other than those of their nationality. It is no longer nationality of origin but EU citizenship which entitles one to these rights. Citizens of the EU can vote and stand for office in local elections in their host countries; they can also participate in elections to the European Parliament. If they are long-term residents in their respective foreign countries, on the whole they are also entitled to an equivalent package of social rights and benefits. The most important conclusion to be drawn from these developments is that the entitlement to rights is no longer dependent upon the status of citizenship; legal resident aliens have been incorporated into civil and social rights regimes, as well as being protected by supra-and sub-national legislations. The condition of undocumented aliens, as well as of refugees and asylum seekers, however, remains in that murky domain between legality and illegality. Until their applications have been approved, refugees and asylums seekers are not entitled to choose freely their domicile or to accept employment.
A resolution to permit those whose application is still in process the right to work after three months of residency has recently been approved by the EU Council of Ministers. In some cases, children of refugees and asylees can attend school; on the whole, asylees and refugees are entitled to certain forms of medical care. Undocumented migrants, by contrast, are cut off from rights and benefits and mostly live and work in clandestine.
The conflict between sovereignty and hospitality has weakened in intensity but it has by no means been eliminated. In fact, the EU is caught in contradictory currents which move it toward norms of cosmopolitan justice in the treatment of those who are within its boundaries, while leading it to act in accordance with outmoded Westphalian conceptions of unbridled sovereignty toward those who are on the outside. The negotiation between insider and outsider status has become tense and almost warlike.
The decline of the unitary model of citizenship, therefore, does not mean that its hold upon our political imagination or that its normative force in guiding our institutions have grown obsolete. It does mean that we must be ready to imagine forms of political agency and subjectivity which anticipate new modalities of political citizenship. In the era of cosmopolitan norms, new forms of political agency have emerged that challenge the distinctions between citizens and long-term residents, insiders and outsiders. The spread of cosmopolitan norms, under whose aegis the disaggregation of citizenship proceeds, has led to contestations of the boundaries of the demos. Using the concepts of 'jurisgenerative politics' and 'democratic iterations,' I would like to propose an analytical grid for thinking about the interrelationship of cosmopolitan norms and democratic politics.
III Democratic Iterations
'Iteration' is a term which was introduced into the philosophy of language through Jacques Derrida's work. 13 In the process of repeating a term or a concept, we never simply produce a replica of the original usage and its intended meaning: rather, every repetition is a form of variation. Every iteration transforms meaning, adds to it, 
(Emphasis added)
I want to suggest that we think of "jurisgenesis" as occurring through iterative or destabilizing acts through which a democratic people, who considers itself bound by certain guiding norms and principles, reappropriates and reinterprets them, thus showing itself to be not only the subject but also the author of the laws (Frank Michelman).
Whereas natural right doctrines assume that the principles which undergird democratic politics are impervious to transformative acts of popular collective will, and whereas legal positivism identifies democratic legitimacy with the correctly generated legal norms of a sovereign legislature, jurisgenerative politics signals a space of interpretation and intervention between universal norms and the will of democratic majorities. The rights claims which frame democratic politics, on the one hand must be viewed as transcending the specific enactments of democratic majorities under specific circumstances; on the other hand, such democratic majorities re-iterate these principles and incorporate them into democratic will-formation processes through argument, contestation, revision and rejection.
Since they are dependent on contingent processes of democratic will-formation, not all jurisgenerative politics yields positive results. Thus one ought not make the validity of cosmopolitan norms dependent upon jurisgenerative and democratic iterations.
This validity must be based on independent normative grounds. But productive or creative jurisgenerative politics results in the augmentation of the meaning of rights claims and in the growth of the political authorship of political actors, who make these rights their own by democratically deploying them.
Sterile, legalistic or populistic jurisgenerative processes are also conceivable. In some cases, no normative learning may take place at all, but only a strategic bargaining among the parties may result; in other cases, the political process may simply run into the sandbanks of legalism or the majority of the demos may trample upon the rights of the minority in the name of some totalizing discourse of fear and war. A similar change in its election laws was undertaken by the free state of Hamburg such as to enable those of its foreign residents of at least eighteen years to participate in the election of local municipal assemblies (Bezirkversammlungen). Since Hamburg is not a federal province (Land) but a free city-state, with its own constitution, some of the technical aspects of this decision are not parallel to those in the case of SchleswigHolstein. I chose to focus on the latter case alone. It is nonetheless important to note that the Federal Government, which had opposed Schleswig-Holstein's electoral reforms, supported those of Hamburg. See BVerfG 83, 60, II, Nr. 4, one, and who were citizens of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, would be able to vote in local and district-wide elections. The choice of these six countries was made on the grounds of reciprocity. Since these countries permitted their foreign residents to vote in local, and in some cases regional elections, the German provincial legislators saw it appropriate to reciprocate. Ad. a The Court argued that according to the principle of popular sovereignty, there needed to be a "congruence" between the principle of democracy, the concept of the people and the main guidelines for voting rights, at all levels of state power-namely, federal, provincial, district and communal. Different conceptions of popular sovereignty could not be employed at different levels of the state. Permitting long-term resident foreigners to vote would imply that popular sovereignty would be defined in different fashion at the district-wide and communal levels than at the provincial and federal levels.
In an almost direct repudiation of the Habermasian discursive democracy principle, the Court declared that Article 20 of Germany's Basic Law does not imply that "the decisions of state organs must be legitimized through those whose interests are affected The Court here explicitly addresses what can be called "the paradox of democratic legitimacy," namely that those whose rights to inclusion or exclusion from the demos are being decided upon will not themselves be the ones to decide upon these rules. Representation can run along many lines besides territorial residency. Yet there is a crucial link between democratic self-governance and territorial closure. Precisely because democracies enact laws that are supposed to bind those who legitimately authorize them, the scope of democratic legitimacy cannot extend beyond the demos which has circumscribed itself as a people upon a given territory. Democratic laws require closure precisely because democratic representation must be accountable to a specific people. Imperial legislation, by contrast, was issued from a center and was binding as far as the power of that center to control its periphery extended. Empires have frontiers; democracies have boundaries. I see no way to cut this Gordian knot linking territoriality, representation and democratic voice.
Certainly, representative institutions based on other principles will exist and they ought to proliferate. In a well-functioning democracy there will be a contentious dialogue, a series of contested iterations, between the demos and such representative bodies about their jurisdictional limits and authority. While no one instance within the separation of powers can claim ultimate authority for itself, all democracies need to recognize some instances which have the final say. But, as in the case of the German Constitutional Court's decision, finality does not mean irreversibility or infallibility. The complex dialogue between the democratically elected representatives of the people, the judicial instances, and other civil and politic actors is a never-ending one of complex and contentious iterations. Within such dialogues, the demos can reconstitute itself by enfranchising groups without voice or by providing amnesty for illegal migrants. While the scope of the authority of the law can be reflexively altered, it is inconceivable that democratic legitimacy can be sustained without some clear demarcation of those in the name of whom the laws have been enacted.
Why did Kant claim that a world-government would be a "universal monarchy" and a "soulless despotism"? 23 Montesquieu's model of political rule may have played a role here. Montesquieu argued that empires were compatible with vast territories, while republics required countries of moderate size. 24 In empires, only one was free, while the rest obeyed; in republics all would be free. The more extensive the territory, the more frayed interconnections among individuals would become, the more indifferent they would grow to each other's lot. In contemporary language, we may say that interest in democratic voice as well as solidarity with others would disappear.
The intuition that there may be a fine link between territorial size and form of government is old in the history of Western political thought, and it is one that I accept.
Unlike communitarians and liberal nationalists, however, who view this link primarily as being based upon a cultural bond of identity, I am concerned with the logic of democratic representation, which requires closure for the sake of maintaining democratic legitimacy.
Certainly, identification and solidarity are important but they need to be leavened through democratic attachments and constitutional norms. In the spirit of Kant, therefore, I plead for moral universalism and cosmopolitan federalism. I do not advocated open but rather porous borders; I plead for first admittance rights for refugees and asylum seekers but accept the right of democracies to regulate the transition from first admission to full membership; I also advocate that laws governing naturalization and citizenship be subject to human rights norms and international law. State sovereignty is not a prerogative that can bar naturalization and the eventual citizenship of aliens in our midst. The new democratic politics is about negotiating this complex relationship between the rights of full membership, democratic voice and territorial residence.
